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In Wittgenstein on Language and Thought, Thornton gives 
an account of naturalization that he calls “repre-
sentationalism”: “Representationalism attempts to explain 
linguistic content as resulting from mental content and then 
to give a reductionist account of the latter. Mental content 
is ‘naturalised’ through the provision of a causal 
explanation of content” (p. vii). Thus we have a two-step 
reduction, first from linguistic content to mental content, 
then from the mental to the physical. Mental content is 
seen in representations, “internal mental representations 
that stand in causal relations to things in the world” (viii). 
Fodor’s “descriptive causal theory” and Millikan’s 
“teleological, or natural selective” account are given as 
examples of such representationalism. Wittgenstein, on 
the other hand, Thornton shows, opposes such 
reductionist theories already in the first step: 
Representations and mental content so understood would 
be too isolated and internal, too detached from the outside 
world. Linguistic content and meaning cannot be 
understood this way. Instead, they should be seen as 
being more “outside” from the start, making sense only 
within language and its use in society.  
How would Kant fare in such current discussions? 
Certainly he has much to say about representations, 
Vorstellungen, Latin representationes. He also has read 
Locke and Hume and is aware of their empiricist accounts 
of impressions and ideas, as well as of Descartes’ res 
cogitans. Yet Kant does not take the same route they do. 
He is usually not mentioned in current discussions of 
naturalization and reductionism of the mental to the 
physical. Nevertheless, although he does not – returning to 
Thornton – talk about linguistic content, he has much to 
say about judgments and representations. Certainly 
representations must have meaning, and they often arise 
from perceptions. Objects appear to us, and we don’t 
make them up. Kant was not an idealist like Berkeley. He 
even distanced himself from Descartes, whom he also saw 
as an idealist (A 226/B 274). Unlike them, he never 
doubted the existence of the outside world. He saw himself 
as an “empirical realist” instead. So how would Kant react 
to current physicalist-reductionist accounts of 
representations and meanings?  
When looking at his early writings, such as his 
“General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, or An 
Attempt to Understand the Structure and Mechanical 
Origin of the Whole Universe According to Newton’s 
Principles”, one might think he has a liking for 
naturalization. But when thinking of his Critique of Pure 
Reason, one starts to have doubts. Why is that? 
Central to Kant’s transcendental philosophy from his 
Critique of Pure Reason are the categories, imagination, 
understanding, schemata, and these can easily appear to 
be mental in some way. Not without reason, Kantian 
faculty-talk is sometimes seen as psychological. In any 
case, one might want to call Kant a representationalist of 
some kind, simply because the notion of Vorstellung, Latin 
representatio, holds a central place in his theoretical 
transcendental philosophy.  
But somehow Kant cannot be a representationalist 
of the kind Thornton has in mind. He does not understand 
his theory as giving an account of “mental” content in an 
individual person’s head, and he certainly does not try to 
reduce mental representations to causal stories.  
Such an undertaking would undercut his 
transcendental project from the start, or, rather, it would 
not touch it, but miss it altogether. Kant is not interested in 
an individual person’s head and in how empirical concepts 
arise and are acquired, as Locke was. To the contrary, he 
wants to establish a priori concepts that make such 
experience possible. These concepts, the categories, are 
not understood as mental in opposition to the physical. 
They are very special concepts. They make the physical 
as such possible, and the naturalists do not talk about 
them at all. In a sense, transcendental philosophy 
undercuts the mind-body naturalist’s project. Kant does not 
start with a mind-body dualism, with categories in the head 
and objects out there to be schematized. He also does not 
go in for the Cartesian res extensa – res cogitans 
distinction. 
For Kant, the categories underlie the world we 
experience, because objects are nothing but appearances 
brought under schematized categories. Not only objects, 
but even time and space are not out there, independently 
of us. The forms of time and space are subjective and 
make objectivity possible. If there is a “head” in the sense 
of transcendental philosophy, then the world has to be in it 
– at least the a priori aspects of it.  
Kant distinguishes between an inner and an outer 
sense, but not between an inner world of representations 
in the head and an outer world next to it.  
In particular, it is empirical causality that is seen, 
within transcendental philosophy, to depend on a priori 
causality, and therefore it would not make any sense to try 
to reduce the transcendentally mental to the empirically 
causal. Empirical concepts and representations might be 
naturalized, but not a priori ones. Transcendental 
philosophy and the Copernican revolution go the other way 
around. They are independent of any philosophical project 
in which causality is taken for granted, as Fodor, Millikan 
and others do. It is not that such projects do not make any 
sense. The point here is that even if they succeed, they 
will not answer Kant’s question about the possibility of 
experience and objectivity. Naturalizing projects take 
objectivity and the physical world for granted.  
It is as Barry Stroud says, in contrast to Jay 
Rosenberg’s historicizing, evolutionary and naturalizing 
accounts (Rosenberg, 616-20) of the Kantian minimalist 
“conceptual core” (615): “The absence of any interesting 
necessary conditions of thought and experience must be 
established, and not simply asserted as likely on general 
historical or ‘evolutionary’ grounds. Even the most 
uncompromising ‘evolutionary’ attitude would not preclude 
us from asking what it is that makes thought or experience 
possible – how it is possible for thought and experience to 
have ‘objects’, or be ‘of’ or ‘about’ something. It remains to 
be seen that that very general question itself must be 
given an historical or ‘evolutionary’ answer, even if an 
historical or ‘evolutionary’ answer must be given to the 
quite different question of who and why in the development 
of homo sapiens those conditions ever in fact came to be 
fulfilled.” (Stroud 1977, 81-82) 




Doubting causality in the way Hume did is mistaken 
in Kant’s eyes. We need an a priori concept of causality 
from the start to have any of the coherent experiences that 
we as a matter of fact do have. Particular empirical 
causalities can be learned about in experience, but not 
causality in general, universally, as such, which we need in 
order to have any meaningful experiences to start with.  
To have an apparently simple experience such as 
the perception of a ship, we need to see the ship as a unit, 
and for that we need the category of substance. That the 
parts of the ship stay where they are and do not float 
around chaotically and dissolve, and that I distinguish the 
ship from my perceiving it, presupposes a priori causality. 
Thus just to perceive a ship, without even invoking the 
question of empirical causality by asking whether it is 
going downstream or upstream, the categories are 
needed.  
Even deeper, it is I who perceives the ship and I am 
conscious of this act. It is I who gives it unity and meaning 
in perception and judgment. Already here I do something 
that requires a priori concepts. (For accounts of Kant on 
the I and the soul, the ‘unity of thought argument’ and the 
‘inner sense argument’, and on the complexities of various 
kinds of immaterialism of the soul, see Ameriks 2000, 
especially pp. 27-47. For a defense of the view that the 
categories go “all the way out”, see Wenzel 2005.) 
We might be tempted to see even these a priori 
concepts and their application as being something mental 
again. After all, Kant thinks of the categories as subjective. 
But the Kantian subject is not a mind-brain that is causally 
affected. In the framework of his transcendental 
epistemology, the subject even comprises time and space, 
as forms of all appearances. If we think of ourselves as 
being affected by things “outside of us”, außer uns, then 
these things are understood, transcendentally, as nothing 
but simply different and distinct from (logically außer) us 
and, empirically, as objects that are always already 
subjected to those subjective conditions of time and space 
and the categories (spatially außer uns). 
The Kantian transcendental subject is not a mere 
res cogitans. It is more. It comprises time and space as 
forms of intuition. Kant holds this against Descartes. A 
pure science of the res cogitans, the “I think”, would not 
get us anywhere. No rational knowledge of the outside 
world, even of ourselves, could be obtained from it. Also 
no limits of our empirical knowledge could be pointed out 
in this way, which is something important for Kant, but not 
for the naturalist today.  
Kant distinguishes his transcendental idealism from 
what he calls “transcendental realism”, which is the view 
that time and space are things in themselves, independent 
of us. Common sense takes this view. If one starts in this 
way, one can depict oneself as some kind of mind-brain-
body at one location and the tree one perceives as being 
“outside”, ten meters away. Then one can start to give a 
causal story of sense perception, even look into the brain 
and try to give a causal account of consciousness and our 
having representations as well, maybe with the addition of 
evolutionary and social aspects. Reductionism lives here, 
and Kripke and Putnam for instance have given accounts 
of what we mean by “water” and H2O in this way. 
Transcendental realism starts with a picture of the world 
that is independent of us, with water as H2O already out 
there. But if we then place ourselves in this world, how can 
we be sure that this is how it really is? How can we avoid 
skepticism? Thus with Putnam we run into a problem 
similar to Descartes’ doubt. We might be a brain in a vat, 
nay even the whole world might not exist. 
But according to transcendental idealism, neither my 
brain, nor the tree, nor time and space are independent of 
representational conditions. It is only as appearances that 
they are in time and space, and it is only as being subject 
to the categories that they are objects. This is an instance 
of the general view that any third-person account 
presupposes a first-person perspective. Cassam’s criticism 
that “Kant’s mistake was to conclude … that the unity of 
consciousness does not involve being presented to 
oneself as an object at all” might still be within this view (p. 
198). 
Experience requires an act of synthesis, which in 
turn requires unity. It must be my experience. For the 
materialist it might be the brain or the object that gives this 
unity. For Kant it is the act that must provide it. In 
meaningful perception and in judgment we take something 
as something and the “taking” itself must have unity 
(Allison 1996, pp. 95, 102). For Kant it is transcendental 
consciousness (Reflexion 5661, AA 18, 318-9) and the 
original synthetic unity of apperception (CpR, B 134) that 
provide this unity, and they do this a priori, that is, prior to 
experience. When the materialist points to the brain, our 
sense organs, and their evolutionary adaptations to their 
functions and the environment, and the socio-linguist 
points to our language and society, Kant will point out that 
they take time and space and empirical objects for 
granted, as things in themselves, and thereby beg the 
question. If they also want to naturalize the act of taking 
something as something, we may respond with Allison that 
“taken in an investigation of its causal conditions, any 
token of the act of thinking is itself something represented, 
an object for an I, which, considered as such, is not itself 
an object in the world. In short, we return in the end to the 
ineliminability and systematic elusiveness of this 
ubiquitous ‘I think’” (Allison, 1996, p. 104). Furthermore, 
we can add that the materialists will run into the problem of 
skepticism, because they cannot be sure that the objects, 
which for them exist independently of us, are correctly 
represented by us whenever we have representations of 
them, that is, when they appear to us. In Kant’s words, the 
transcendental realist then “plays the empirical idealist” (A 
369).  
In Kant’s picture the object is nothing but its 
appearance, and so the correspondence problem does not 
arise. Truth is in judgment, not in appearance. Ironically, 
one may also say that in the view of transcendental 
philosophy appearance already gives truth, a-letheia, as 
Heidegger wanted it, insofar as appearance and its object 
are not two separate things (contrary to the transcendental 
realist’s view). The object does not need to be “deduced” 
from its appearance (A 372). It exists only as appearance. 
It is its appearance. Appearance is not something extra. 
Imagine the following conversation between a 
transcendental realist (TR) and a transcendental idealist 
(TI): 
 
TR: “I think representations are generated in the 
brain.” 
 
TI: “You mean processes happening in the brain? 
Well, they happen in time and space. You imagine 
them as appearances.” 
 
TR: “But are they not caused? Are not our repre-
sentations, imaginations, perceptions all caused?” 
 




TI: “Well, according to their matter, materialiter, yes. 
But according to their form, formaliter, no. That I see 
a hand with five fingers, of a certain size, with a cer-
tain color, hue and shade, in a certain light, and un-
der a certain angle, yes, there is a causal story to be 
told for this. But that the hand appears in time and 
space at all, and that it has parts, for these facts 
there is no causal story to be told. You can reduce 
material properties to their causes, but not the for-
mal ones (for which you need the categories and 
time and space). Furthermore, it is these formal as-
pects that make your causal stories possible. 
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